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In A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, I ad-
dressed an efficiency problem that arises when the government at-
tempts to change property rights in a manner that burdens a very few
for the benefit of the very many. Specifically, in the absence of com-
pensation, the collective action advantage of the few in organizing to
oppose the proposed measure will often give them a decided edge
against the many. As a result of that advantage, the few will too often
be able to persuade the legislature not to act, even when an objective
evaluation of the proposal's costs and benefits would demonstrate the
action's desirability. From this perspective, the risk of an overly nar-
row compensation requirement is not that the government will take
too much, but too little. The government will forgo desirable projects
because of political opposition from the uncompensated few. The so-
lution I proposed was to interpret the Compensation Clause to require
compensation to the few in such contests - a strict theory of singling
* Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. B.S. 1984, Texas A&M Univer-
sity; J.D. 1990, Stanford University. - Ed. I would like to thank Marjorie Kornhauser, Mark
Wessman, and my wife Leslie Lunney for comments on earlier drafts of this Response.
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Michigan Law Review
out if you will.2 By doing so, we could reduce or, with full compensa-
tion, eliminate the few's opposition to the measure and thereby im-
prove the legislature's ability both to evaluate the proposed action's
merits and to go forward should action prove desirable.
In a recent article, Professor Dagan recognizes the efficiency im-
plications of this public choice analysis, critiques some aspects of my
proposed solution, and offers an alternative based on a principle he
calls "progressive compensation."3 In his analysis, he attempts to inject
an express distributive justice component into the compensation
analysis, while at the same time solving the efficiency problem that
public choice theory suggests. Although Professor Dagan's analysis
reminds us of the important role the Compensation Clause plays in
equalizing results between politically powerful and politically weak
property owners, I believe that his critique is unpersuasive and that his
proposed solution, while ambitious, will not work in the manner he
suggests.
To address these points, Part I of this Response discusses the
Compensation Clause's tendency to equalize results between the po-
litically powerful and the politically weak and explains what I believe
Professor Dagan is trying to achieve. Part I will focus on an initial case
in which the government must choose between imposing a taking ei-
ther on a group of relatively rich property owners or on a group of
relatively poor property owners. Part II will explain why Professor
Dagan's proposal is unlikely to achieve its efficiency and distributive
justice goals in this initial case and will identify additional difficulties
that would be presented if his proposal did work. Part III will then
present a second case in which the government faces a choice, not be-
tween two different project sites, but whether to undertake a project
at all. In this second case, Professor Dagan's proposal would appear to
limit the availability of compensation when the project, if undertaken,
would impose a taking on relatively rich property owners. As we shall
see, however, such an approach to the compensation issue would
likely frustrate the government's ability to move forward on desirable
projects For both of these cases, a uniform few-many approach with
increased compensation generally for the few, would better address
the goals of both efficiency and distributive justice. Part IV compares
how Professor Dagan's progressive takings approach and my own uni-
2. Id. at 1954-55; see also Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9
CONST. COMMENT. 279, 299, 307 (1992) (recognizing a similar public choice concern, but
then proposing a test that defines as takings those regulations that are "functionally equiva-
lent to a governmental land acquisition").
3. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741 (1999).
4. Moreover, the nature of the political process will likely lead to imperfect information
about the need for compensation. As a result, the legislature will usually prove unable to
mollify political opposition because of its inability to identify appropriate cases for the pay-
ment of compensation. See infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
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form few-many approach would apply to the facts of Penn Central.
Part V concludes by reflecting on the limitations of the Compensation
Clause, and of the law in general, for inculcating the kinds of values
espoused by Professor Dagan.
Before beginning the discussion, I should also mention two further
points. First, I will restrict my analysis of Professor Dagan's proposal
to a consideration of the role that distributive justice may serve within
the context of the Compensation Clause. I suppose that most would
readily agree that the Compensation Clause alone cannot serve as the
principal means for achieving distributive justice, however defined.
Government impositions on property are too random and sporadic to
achieve the systematic redistribution of property that distributive jus-
tice may require. Second, I do not understand Professor Dagan's pro-
posal as a mere precatory exhortation to planners and administrators
to consider wealth in determining project placements. Rather, I under-
stand his proposal as a call for specific changes in constitutional doc-
trine.5 Given that "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the ju-
dicial department to say what the law is,"6 Professor Dagan's proposal
is presumably directed at the judicial branch, requesting that they re-
vise the present interpretation of the Compensation Clause in order to
influence government decisions as to project siting. It may be that this
judicial influence on siting decisions will become transparent once the
legislative branch and associated administrative agencies have had the
opportunity to internalize whatever compensation rules courts impose.
But that should not mislead us. Judicial attempts to influence and to
control government policy through constitutional interpretation nec-
essarily entail judicial supervision over the other branches of govern-
ment. We should therefore consider whether separation of powers
would permit such judicial activism and, if so, whether the judiciary is
the most appropriate branch of government for implementing policies
of progressive compensation. With these points in mind, we can begin
our analysis of Professor Dagan's proposal.
I. JUST COMPENSATION AS EQUALIZER
As compared to a no-compensation world, the Compensation
Clause tends to equalize government-imposed burdens between politi-
cally powerful (and typically rich) property owners and politically
weak (and typically poor) property owners.7 The example I use derives
5. See Dagan, supra note 3, at 768-90.
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. A correlation between wealth and political power will arise to the extent that the
wealthy have better access to governmental decisionmakers, are more "like" the decision-
makers in class and race, or have more experience in dealing with the government. The
wealthy may also have an advantage given the resources that they can devote to politicians
who favor them. While both the wealthy and the poor alike have resources that they can de-
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from a freeway' planning case in Los Angeles.8 In the example, the
government is considering whether to add: (1) another east-west free-
way somewhat south of 1-10 (i.e., running through Watts and other
poor, typically African-American communities); or (2) a north-south
freeway west of downtown (i.e., running through Beverly Hills). If the
government must choose between these two projects, both planning
considerations and political considerations will likely influence the
government's decision. From a planning perspective, the government
should select the project that generates more net benefit for a given
cost, where benefits and costs are objectively determined by a freeway
or planning department. This selection would be the "objectively bet-
ter planning decision." Political factors, however, almost invariably in-
fluence such decisions. These political factors may influence the deci-
sionmaking process subtly, by reshaping the government's perception
of a project's costs and benefits, or more directly, by threatening the
project itself (e.g. through a referendum) or the reelection of the proj-
ect's proponents in the legislature.
If an interest group is better organized, more concentrated, more
experienced at lobbying, or otherwise has improved access to the gov-
ernmental decisionmakers (a "more effective group"), it will tend to
have disproportionate political strength. For any given cost at risk or
benefit available from proposed government action, such an interest
group will prove relatively more persuasive in making the political
case for its desired outcome than an interest group without these ad-
vantages (a "less effective interest group"). When the government
must decide an issue pitting a more effective group against a less effec-
tive interest group, the difference in political effectiveness will tend to
distort the planning decision.
In cases in which the government faces a choice between siting a
project on a wealthy community or on a poor community, as in our
freeway example, the government always seems to decide on another
Watts freeway (almost without regard to an objective evaluation of
the merits). The reason for this selection is simple: The present meas-
ure of "just" compensation does not fully compensate landowners for
their losses;9 both groups of landowners therefore oppose the pro-
vote to political persuasion, not the least of which is their vote, the wealthy can more readily
devote money (and access to others with money) to political causes. Given the costs of po-
litical campaigning, money will often prove more valuable to a politician seeking (re)election
than the volunteer time, or even the votes, that the poor can offer.
8. This example is based loosely on the history of the Century Freeway (1-105) in the
Los Angeles basin. See Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Keith v. Volpe,
352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972), afjd sub nom. Keith v. Cal. Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d
696 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
9. Compensation is not complete for two reasons. First, the measure of "just" compen-
sation presently used does not compensate landowners fully for their losses. See Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CAT. U. L. REV. 721, 759-
61 (1993). Second, some persons who experience losses do not receive compensation at all,
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posed freeways in their respective neighborhoods, but the Beverly
Hills contingent opposes more effectively than the Watts contingent.
The poorer Watts landowners therefore lose the freeway placement
battle.
This example suggests two distinct concerns that may arise from
the interaction of politics and planning." First, to the extent that the
Beverly Hills landowners are a more effective group politically, the
Beverly Hills landowners may successfully persuade the government
to place the freeway through Watts even though the Beverly Hills
freeway is, from a planning perspective, more desirable. Political in-
fluences may thus lead to inefficient project placement. Second, if
similar political pressures lead the government to site projects system-
atically in poor neighborhoods, relatively poor neighborhoods will
host a disproportionate share of such government projects. Precisely
to the extent that "just" compensation presently fails to compensate
property owners fully for their losses, property owners who experience
government takings are effectively subsidizing the government proj-
ect. Disproportionate imposition of takings on poor neighborhoods
therefore creates a regressive tax that raises distributive justice con-
cerns.
The Compensation Clause, as presently interpreted, addresses
both of these concerns to some extent. At the very least, it ensures
some compensation - "fair market value" - for property owners
either because the nature of the loss does not qualify as a taking (i.e., a neighbor whose land
is not physically taken or encroached upon, but who now has a freeway right next to her
house) or because the loss is not to a property interest (i.e., an apartment dweller with an at-
will rental agreement).
10. In his reply essay, Professor Dagan notes that I have not addressed his moral hazard
argument that full compensation may lead landowners to overinvest in their property confi-
dent of receiving compensation in the event of a government taking. Hanoch Dagan, Just
Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MICH. L. REV. 501, 504 & n.9 (2000). In
this regard, his analysis builds on the work of William Fischel and Perry Shapiro, who origi-
nally suggested that, at least as a theoretical matter, full compensation may create some de-
gree of moral hazard. William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 269, 272-74 (1988) (comparing the moral hazard that would allegedly be cre-
ated by full compensation under the Compensation Clause to the moral hazards created by
fire insurance, payments to the victims of pollution, and tenure for law professors). Neither
Fischel and Shapiro, nor Professor Dagan offer any evidence, whether empirical, anecdotal,
or otherwise, that this theoretical concern actually affects the way people behave in this area,
and I have suggested elsewhere reasons why the supposed moral hazard will not arise.
Lunney, supra note 9, at 767-68. In any event, to whatever trivial degree full compensation
may create a moral hazard, suggesting that the practical consequences of this moral hazard
are as significant as those that arise from powerful interest groups blocking desirable gov-
ernment action, as Professor Dagan implicitly does, is simply not credible.
As for the personality theories of property that Professor Dagan relies upon, I do not
address them because I find them incoherent. They rely on a supposed consensus regarding
property ownership that does not exist at a sufficiently concrete level to prove helpful. See
generally Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Personhood: A Critique of Radin's Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 352-54, 361-79 (1993).
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who experience a taking.1 Although fair market value is incomplete
compensation (because it fails to include subjective valuations), it is a
substantial improvement over no compensation. In a no-compensation
world, the politically less powerful would still bear a disproportionate
share of government-imposed burdens, but without any compensation
at all.
Professor Dagan is understandably not satisfied with this unequal
equality. He desires a compensation regime that would achieve some-
thing closer to true equality between rich and poor property owners.
He uses the phrase "progressive compensation" to describe his pro-
posed solution and, as the phrase suggests, the concept is to compen-
sate more readily or at a higher level the less-wealthy property own-
ers." Such an approach compensates the poor property owners more
generously when they experience government-imposed burdens, and
thereby addresses the distributive justice concern. Professor Dagan
also claims, however, that his approach will lead the government to
impose burdens more efficiently at the outset and thereby resolve the
inefficient project placement concern. Specifically, by requiring the
government to pay relatively more to the Watts landowners in our ex-
ample, Professor Dagan apparently hopes to create a budgetary pres-
sure (by increasing the relative cost of the Watts freeway) that will
neutralize the lobbying pressure of the politically more powerful
Beverly Hills contingent. 3 With equal pressure from both sides, the
Planning Department will be free to make the objectively better plan-
ning decision and will impose the taking on the richer landowners
when planning considerations so dictate. 4 I do not believe, however,
that Professor Dagan's proposed solution will solve the efficiency
11. Applying "fair market value" as the proper measure of just compensation represents
something of an oxymoron because market value presupposes a willing seller, while eminent
domain is a forced sale.
12. Professor Dagan's actual implementation of the concept is fairly limited, emphasiz-
ing a balance between long-term reciprocity of advantage and the extent of the immediate
disproportionate financial loss imposed, in determining whether to award compensation at
all. Dagan, supra note 3, at 768-90. For our purposes, it does not really matter whether we
create a relative difference in compensation levels through a refusal to compensate alto-
gether in certain cases, a change in the amount of compensation awarded, or a combination
of both approaches. For now, we will assume that courts will implement progressive com-
pensation through a combination of both approaches because that allows more flexibility in
tailoring relative compensation levels, compared to the blunt tool of refusing to award com-
pensation.
13. Id. at 754 ("A progressive compensation rule tends to ensure that the placing issue
will be resolved according to planning considerations since it balances the relative pressures
of strong and weak landowners.").
14. This is not the only possible result. Public choice research suggests that given strong
support and opposition to a measure, the government may choose to defer or avoid alto-
gether a decision. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 288-90 (1988).
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problem, and, even if it did, I would worry that achieving a balance in
such a way would prove undesirable.
II. A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR DAGAN'S PROPOSAL
A. Does Progressive Compensation Achieve the Desired
Counterbalance?
Project sitings in a representative democracy are inevitably part
planning and part political. Our first concern is that political influence
may improperly skew the planning decision and lead to an inefficient
project siting. We therefore begin our evaluation of Professor Dagan's
proposal by examining how progressive compensation would affect
the political aspect of siting decisions. In our freeway example, the
concept of progressive compensation would require the government, if
it builds the freeway, to pay the Watts landowners somewhat more
than under current rules and/or pay the Beverly Hills landowners
somewhat less. Professor Dagan believes that adopting such a com-
pensation rule would make it more likely that the government would
place the freeway in Beverly Hills. To evaluate Professor Dagan's po-
sition, we need some sense for how the government makes decisions.
Traditionally in discussing the Compensation Clause, courts and
commentators have treated the government like a private actor.15
From this perspective, any increase in the scope of the compensation
requirement would increase the cost of government action and reduce
what the government can achieve with the resources available, just as
increased prices would decrease a private actor's spending power. At
the same time, the risk from too narrow a compensation requirement
is that the government would take too much, just as a private individ-
ual would take too much if she did not have to pay. Given this per-
spective, liberal members of the Court have generally preferred to re-
strict the reach of the Compensation Clause in order to allow the
government more room to advance public welfare. 6 Conservative
members of the Court, on the other hand, have preferred a somewhat
broader interpretation of the Compensation Clause to rein in potential
governmental excesses. 7
15. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the
Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999). The private actor-political actor dichotomy
parallels a similar analysis that Professor Daryl J. Levinson has recently presented. Daryl J.
Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345,347-51 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 133-35 & n.30
(1978).
17. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) ("On the other
side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that
regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive op-
tions for its use - typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural
October 20001
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Yet the government is not a private actor. It is a political actor and
is subject to ever-present political constraints. Elected officials and
those they appoint cannot simply take any property they like, even if
compensation were not required. They must consider the conse-
quences of their actions, both on their constituents and on their con-
tinued tenure in office. To impose regulatory burdens on property
owners, elected officials must deal with the political opposition of
those individuals whose property will be affected. And if they take too
much without paying, elected officials will face the consequences in
the next election.
When we recognize this distinction between political and private
actors, we find that a broader interpretation of the Compensation
Clause may facilitate, rather than limit, the government's ability to ad-
vance the public welfare. As a political actor, the government, when it
evaluates the costs and benefits of a proposed project, is not acting
simply for itself, as a private actor might, but rather as the representa-
tive of all those owners affected by the measure. As a result, the gov-
ernment should consider costs imposed even if not borne by the gov-
ernment directly and should consider benefits generated even if not
received directly by the government. In an ideal world, the govern-
ment would have perfect information as to the costs and benefits of
each proposal, would fully and objectively evaluate each and every
proposal's merits, and would act accordingly. 8 As part of this process,
the government would also determine the need for and pay compensa-
tion when appropriate and desirable. In such an ideal world, a consti-
tutional requirement of compensation would prove superfluous and
would not influence governmental action or decisionmaking.
Yet our world is not quite so ideal. In the absence of perfect in-
formation and in the presence of political influence, a constitutional
compensation requirement can strongly affect and significantly im-
prove governmental decisionmaking. If the government seeks to bal-
ance the interests of competing constituencies, as the political actor
model maintains, paying compensation can improve the ability of the
government both to identify and to move forward on desirable proj-
ects. Specifically, if courts were to interpret the Constitution to require
state - carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.").
18. This model is an idealized form of the social choice account of government, in which
the government is an organic entity that always seeks to act in the best interest of society as a
whole. In contrast to the social choice account, the public choice perspective sees the gov-
ernment as a group of individuals, including elected officials, bureaucrats, and administra-
tors, each attempting to maximize his or her own welfare. Under the public choice perspec-
tive, elected officials may seek to maximize their chances of re-election, while administrators
may seek to maximize the power and prestige of their positions. It remains possible under
the public choice perspective that the government may act in the best interest of society as a
whole, but it will do so only when that public interest happens to coincide with the private
interests of the government officials making the decision.
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compensation whenever the government takes property from the very
few to benefit the very many, it would redistribute losses from small,
concentrated groups of property owners to taxpayers generally. Al-
though not universally true, a small, concentrated group will generally
prove more effective politically than a large, dispersed group such as
taxpayers. By compensating the more effective group, we can substan-
tially reduce its reason for opposing proposed government action. As
the more effective group is placated, its undue political influence be-
comes less likely to skew the government's picture of the relative
merits of the alternative project sitings.
Compensation should therefore ensure a more accurate determina-
tion of the proposed action's desirability. In addition, by switching the
loss from a more effective group to a less effective group, requiring
compensation can also substantially reduce the net political opposition
facing a proposed government action. 9 Reduced political opposition
should make it easier for the government to move forward with desir-
able projects. Thus, rather than restrict the government's ability to act,
as the private actor model would suggest, requiring compensation can
improve the government's ability to act and to act appropriately.
If we apply the political actor model of government to Professor
Dagan's proposal, it seems implausible that progressive compensation
would increase the likelihood that the freeway would go through
Beverly Hills rather than Watts. In terms of first order effects on the
parties most directly involved (i.e., the landowners), adopting a pro-
gressive compensation scheme would have two effects. First, as you
reduce the (relative) compensation to the Beverly Hills landowners,
their opposition to the Beverly Hills freeway would likely grow
stronger and even more strident." Second, as you pay more to the
Watts landowners, their opposition to the Watts freeway would be re-
19. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 1955-59.
20. Even if we implemented progressive compensation by increasing the absolute level
of compensation to the Watts landowners, while keeping the absolute level of compensation
to the Beverly Hills landowners the same as under current rules, progressive compensation
would still generate more strenuous opposition by the Beverly Hills contingent. Although
they would be receiving absolutely the same level of compensation under either regime, the
Beverly Hills contingent would still have more to complain about because they would not be
receiving as much as the Watts landowners would have. The perception of unfairness gener-
ated by the unequal compensation levels would lead the Beverly Hills contingent to demand
"equal" (and hence fair) compensation. In his reply essay, Professor Dagan contends that
Beverly Hills landowners will accede to the justice of his proposed progressive compensation
regime, and so not object to the perceived unfairness of (and indeed will not perceive as un-
fair) more extensive compensation for less well-off landowners. Dagan, supra note 10, at
511-12. Alternatively, even if Beverly Hills landowners protest the unfairness of progressive
compensation, Professor Dagan asserts as a fallback position that any such complaints will
carry little weight given the obvious desirability of his proposed progressive compensation
scheme. Id. These views are unrealistic. If accurate, Professor Dagan's reasoning would sug-
gest that high-income taxpayers would have come to accept a strongly progressive income-
tax structure (or at least their arguments against such a structure would carry little weight).
Yet, that has not happened.
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duced. Given increased opposition to the Beverly Hills freeway and
decreased opposition to the Watts freeway, it would appear that pro-
gressive compensation will result in a Watts freeway, not a Beverly
Hills freeway as Professor Dagan anticipates.
But the landowners are not the only ones that would be affected by
a shift to a progressive compensation scheme in the freeway siting
case. Increased compensation to the Watts landowners may also gen-
erate second-order effects on parties concerned generally with the
amount and nature of government expenditures.21 Taxpayers and
other groups competing for government funding, for example, may in-
creasingly oppose the Watts freeway as its price tag increases. For Pro-
fessor Dagan's proposal to solve the efficiency concern, he must es-
tablish that net opposition to a project will increase as compensation
levels increase. This he has not done, but has merely assumed. From
the political actor perspective, progressive compensation will lead to
an increase in net opposition only if the "budget-concerned" groups,
which are increasingly opposed to a project placement as compensa-
tion levels increase, are more effective politically than the group of
landowners increasingly pacified as compensation levels increase. But
this condition will not usually be satisfied. These budget-concerned
groups are unlikely to prove more effective politically in the freeway
placement battle because they are only indirectly affected by the
higher freeway cost that progressive compensation may generate.
Taxpayers, for example, may be generally concerned about higher
taxes, but government takings are unlikely to represent such a large
share of the government's budget that taxpayers will take a particular
interest in them. Similarly, those competing for the government funds
may incidentally worry about an increase in the price of the Watts
freeway, but their central focus is on persuading the government to
adopt their desired program. The freeway projects may be only one of
many potential competitors.
In contrast, the Watts and Beverly Hills landowners are directly af-
fected by both the freeway placement and the relative levels of com-
pensation available. Although we have identified the Watts contingent
as politically weak, the truth is that they are politically weak only rela-
tive to the Beverly Hills landowners. The Watts contingent is likely to
face relatively low transaction costs in organizing to oppose the Watts
freeway, at least compared to the transaction costs facing taxpayers
generally. They are also likely to have several elected representatives
for whom the Watts freeway placement will be a central political issue.
21. So long as some compensation is required, these budget-concerned groups may op-
pose both freeway projects. But to analyze how progressive compensation would affect the
political equation, we need to focus on marginal effects and determine how a shift to a pro-
gressive compensation system would increase or decrease political opposition to a given
project compared to the present compensation system.
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As a result, for any given compensation level, the Watts landowners
are likely to prove more effective at opposing the Watts freeway than
the budget-concerned groups with which Professor Dagan proposes to
replace them. Increasing compensation to the Watts landowners
therefore will not reduce any imbalance in political influence between
Watts and Beverly Hills landowners, and may indeed exacerbate it.
If we tried to force (effectively) a choice of the Beverly Hills free-
way through progressive compensation, the likely result would be no
freeway at all. For example, over the short term, the government may
face a budgetary constraint for the freeway project selected. Given
that budgetary constraint, we could find and adopt a compensation
rule sufficiently progressive so that only the Beverly Hills freeway
might be affordable. In such a case, a progressive compensation
scheme might appear a viable way to force the Beverly Hills freeway
through. But the more likely political result would be that neither
freeway would get built - the Watts freeway because it was no longer
affordable and the Beverly Hills freeway because it would not be po-
litically viable.23
That Professor Dagan's desired balance is unlikely to work in the
Los Angeles freeway case does not, of course, mean that it would
never work. There might well be cases in which adopting a progressive
compensation scheme could lead the government both to select land
owned by the politically powerful group and to impose the project
22. In the actual case, the government(s) promised far more extensive efforts to mitigate
the consequences of the freeway's placement than the Compensation Clause would strictly
require. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403, 405, 409-10 (C.D. Cal. 1980); William
Trombley & Ray Hebert, Bold Housing Program Develops Big Problems: Plan Plagued by
Shoddy Construction, Cost Overruns, High Vacancy Rates, Opposition, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1987, pt. 1, at 1. Under Professor Dagan's reasoning, the increased cost associated with these
mitigation measures should have increased effective opposition to the project (i.e., increased
opposition from budget-concerned groups should have outweighed decreased opposition
from affected landowners). But these measures made the freeway possible, suggesting that
the affected landowners were far more influential in the process than the budget-concerned
groups.
23. Such a compensation rule would essentially convert the government's decision from
a choice between two project placements, Watts or Beverly Hills, into a decision as to
whether or not to proceed with the Beverly Hills freeway alone. Although freeway users
would likely support the Beverly Hills freeway, they are likely to prove less effective politi-
cally than the Beverly Hills landowners. As compared to the Beverly Hills landowners,
freeway users are extremely diffuse and would likely face considerable transaction costs and
free-rider problems in attempting to organize political support for the freeway. As a result,
persuading the government to build the Beverly Hills freeway will prove difficult politically,
unless the Beverly Hills landowners receive near-complete compensation for their losses.
With near-complete compensation, the unbalanced political contest between the smaller,
more cohesive, and therefore more effective Beverly Hills landowners and the diffuse,
largely unrelated, and therefore less effective freeway users is converted into a more bal-
anced political battle between diffuse taxpayers and diffuse freeway users. See Lunney, supra
note 1, at 263-64; see also text accompanying notes 37-41 infra (discussing more generally the
build-or-not-build case).
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over that group's objections.24 But such cases will likely prove the ex-
ception rather than the rule and arise only when the governmental de-
cisionmaker is sufficiently insulated from political pressure to behave
more like a private actor."
If we truly want the Planning Department to make a decision un-
biased by political influences, increasing compensation to both groups
to a level closer to their true losses would be a simpler and more ap-
propriate avenue. As we increase compensation, we decrease the cen-
tral reason for each landowning group's opposition to the freeway's
placement.26 Although we may never be able to compensate property
owners fully for their losses, particularly for the subjective losses asso-
ciated with the loss of residential neighborhoods, increased compensa-
tion should tend to quiet the opposition from these two groups. As
these two groups are pacified, the Planning Department will be in-
creasingly able to adopt the efficient, rather than the politically expe-
dient, solution.
Increased compensation to both groups would enable the Planning
Department to compare the benefits and costs of each freeway unbi-
ased by political influences.27 Moreover, such an approach would tend
to address Professor Dagan's distributive justice concerns as well.
"Full" compensation would eliminate the subsidy that property own-
ers effectively provide when the government takes their land. As a re-
sult, even if poor neighborhoods continued to bear a disproportionate
share of government takings, funding for such projects would shift
away from the property owners themselves to the taxpayers who fund
the increased compensation payment. To the extent that the funds for
the increased compensation were raised through a progressive tax sys-
tem, the rich would pay for a larger share of government projects than
under the present compensation system.
24. Even if we could, in theory, identify a progressive compensation level that would
lead to a balance between the Beverly Hills landowners and the budget-concerned groups, it
would not be enough for Professor Dagan's balance to work. For the balance to work, the
outcome of the likely compensation decisions ex post must be sufficiently clear to the rele-
vant interest groups ex ante so that they can modulate their support or opposition for the
two alternatives appropriately.
25. The military's acquisition of land may fall within this category, as Professor Joseph
Sax has suggested. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-63
(1964) (arguing that compensation should be required when the government acts as enter-
prise but not as arbitrator).
26. I would define "just" compensation as that level of compensation that made the
landowners indifferent between accepting the payment and the loss they experienced. Com-
pare Dagan, supra note 3, at 755 & n.36, with Lunney, supra note 9, at 757-69.
27. One interesting twist with road construction is that road construction has built-in
interest group support, in the form of road contractors. Their support for road construction
(of any sort) may bias the Planning Department to build more roads than are strictly desir-
able. We might therefore adopt a partial compensation rule so that landowners will remain
somewhat opposed to having their land taken for road construction in order to counterbal-
ance the road contractor's pro-road influence.
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In addition, a uniform few-many rule with increased compensation
better serves the goals of distributive justice generally. Specifically, it
addresses not only issues of distributive justice as between individuals
at different ends of the socioeconomic spectrum ("vertical equity"), it
also ensures horizontal equity between comparably wealthy individu-
als. Because a progressive tax system is likely to impose comparable
tax burdens on comparably wealthy individuals, relying on a progres-
sive tax system to address the vertical equity issue tends to ensure that
comparably wealthy individuals contribute comparably to the distribu-
tive justice effort. In contrast, Professor Dagan's proposal would leave
those "wealthy" individuals who happen to experience a government
taking to bear a disproportionate share of the distributive justice bur-
den compared to other comparably wealthy individuals who do not
experience a taking.
A uniform few-many rule, with increased compensation levels for
the few in all cases, would therefore tend to address both the effi-
ciency concern and the distributive justice concern that we have iden-
tified. Professor Dagan's progressive compensation scheme appears
unable to achieve both of these results.
B. Assuming They Arise, Are the Budgetary Pressures Created by
Progressive Compensation Desirable?
Even if progressive compensation could lead to budgetary pres-
sures that would place projects on the lands of the politically powerful,
difficulties would arise. Using progressive compensation to force the
government's hand fundamentally ignores the fact that political power
sometimes coincides with social welfare. Obviously, when outcomes
happen to coincide with race and wealth in certain ways, there is good
reason to be skeptical as to whether any given outcome necessarily
represented an unbiased balancing of objective planning considera-
tions.28 Progressive compensation, however, appears too blunt a tool
to separate those project placements that resulted from improper bias
from those that properly balanced the costs and benefits at issue. It
simply increases the price tag for one site selection relative to another.
The resulting budgetary pressures may lead the government to impose
takings on a more wealthy, rather than a less wealthy, constituency in
28. For example, in the Watts freeway case, part of the reason the freeway ended up
going through Watts was that the Watts path passed through areas with a mixture of residen-
tial, industrial, and commercial uses. Many of the commercial and industrial Watts landown-
ers actually supported the Watts freeway path, substantially undermining the uniformity of
the Watts landowners' opposition. See William Trombley & Ray Hebert, Road Paved with
Good Intentions, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1987, pt. 1, at 30.
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any given case, but it does so seemingly without regard to the relative
planning merits of the two sites.29
We might be able to avoid this difficulty if we could readily deter-
mine the efficient project placement in each case, by simply awarding
progressive compensation when that would lead to the proper deci-
sion. But such an approach would essentially require a court to iden-
tify the appropriate project placement and then, when necessary, force
its decision (through progressive compensation) on the relevant legis-
lative or administrative body. Such judicial second-guessing will not be
easily accepted in this post-Lochner era. Alternatively, if we could
easily separate the illegitimate sources of the more affluent group's
political power from the legitimate,3" we could award progressive
compensation in those cases in which it appeared that the illegitimate
political power was driving (or would, but for progressive compensa-
tion, drive) the project placement decision. But separating legitimate
from illegitimate political power does not appear to be a noticeably
29. If we assume, for example, that the government behaves like a private actor in a par-
ticular case, then the government will respond only to that portion of the project's true cost
that the government itself must bear. Let us further assume that the government must
choose between two project placements, A and B. Both placements generate comparable
benefits to the public, but the true cost of the A placement is somewhat higher (10%) than
the true cost of the B placement. Given this distribution of costs and benefits, selecting the B
placement represents the efficient or planning-based decision. Under the present system of
uniform compensation, the government will likely bear only a fraction of each placement's
true cost (perhaps 70% of the true cost), but the fraction is likely to be the same for each
placement. For that reason, while the government (if behaving like a private actor) will un-
derestimate the cost of each placement, it will underestimate them to the same extent. The B
placement will continue to appear less expensive (as it is), and the government will select the
B placement. However, if courts following Professor Dagan's approach require a difference
in compensation levels for these two placements, and as it turns out, progressive compensa-
tion requires a higher compensation level (perhaps 85% of true cost) for the B placement
than for the A placement (remains at 70%), then progressive compensation creates a differ-
ential between each placement's true cost and the apparent or perceived cost on which the
government will make its decision. Under these assumptions, progressive compensation
would lead the government to select the inefficient A placement. Thus, progressive compen-
sation may not solve, and may in fact create, inefficiency in project placement decisions.
Whether distributive justice concerns might outweigh efficiency concerns and so justify such
a result is a separate issue. See infra the discussion in Section II.C, text accompanying notes
30-32.
30. I use the terms legitimate and illegitimate power, not to distinguish between legal
(i.e., campaign contributions) and illegal (i.e., bribery) uses of political power, but to sepa-
rate political power that coincides with the underlying merits of proposed government action
from political power that does not. If a group has greater political strength because the ex-
tent of its losses from government action are in fact larger, that increased strength reflects an
increase in the cost of the proposed government action. Such a source of political power is
legitimate because it helps the government more accurately determine the proposed action's
underlying merits. If a group has greater political strength because it is better organized or
has better access to the governmental decisionmakers, however, its increased strength does
not reflect any increase in the underlying costs or benefits of the proposed action. Because
these sources of political power lack a direct connection to the measure's underlying merits,
these sources of political power are illegitimate in the sense that they can mislead the gov-
ernment as to the true desirability of the proposed action.
A Response to Professor Dagan
easier task for a court than does determining a project's proper place-
ment.
If courts are unable to identify in practice those particular cases in
which progressive compensation would improve the efficiency of the
planning process, the grave risk is that they will adopt some uniformly
progressive compensation scheme. If that scheme were to lead to the
budgetary pressures that Professor Dagan articulates, progressive
compensation will press the government to impose takings more often
on affluent communities by making the alternative of burdening the
less-affluent community more expensive. But the higher price tag will
in no way reflect any objective planning merit. As a result, if it works
at all, progressive compensation would introduce an artificial bias into
siting decisions that would inevitably lead to cases in which the gov-
ernment takes from a more affluent group of landowners, even though
planning considerations would dictate otherwise.
C. Distributive Justice and Lochner's Shadow
If we look at project-siting decisions in terms of distributive justice
and efficiency concerns more generally, we can identify three para-
digm cases:
Case 1: Distributive justice and efficiency both favor siting the
project on the land of the more affluent.
Case 2: Distributive justice favors siting the project on the land
of the more affluent; efficiency favors siting the project
on the land of the less affluent. The distributive justice
concern outweighs the efficiency concern.
Case 3: Distributive justice favors siting the project on the land
of the more affluent; efficiency favors siting the project
on the land of the less affluent. The efficiency concern
outweighs the distributive justice concern.31
In considering these three cases, there are two levels of analysis we
must keep in mind. At the first level of analysis, we must determine
how each of these cases should be resolved and whether we can define
a workable compensation rule that will push the government toward
that proper resolution. At this level, Professor Dagan's approach ap-
pears to gloss over the possibility that distributive justice and effi-
ciency may suggest different answers. As a result, Professor Dagan
31. In theory, there are also paradigm cases in which distributive justice would favor
siting the project on the land of the less affluent. In practice, however, such cases would be
extremely rare. The reason is that landowners affected by a project siting are typically only
partially compensated. Consequently, the affected landowners subsidize the project. But dis-
tributive justice would rarely require the less affluent to subsidize public goods. Only if the
less affluent landowners were to be compensated at or above full compensation would dis-
tributive justice entertain the possibility of siting a project on their land.
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fails to offer any means to distinguish Case 2 from Case 3. In addition,
as discussed above, the budgetary pressures that Professor Dagan
hopes to create through progressive compensation may prove insuffi-
cient to ensure proper project siting in Case 1.
At the second level of analysis, we must determine who should de-
cide into which of these three categories any given siting decision
properly falls. At this level, Professor Dagan's analysis runs sharply
counter to recent trends in constitutional doctrine by shifting a consid-
erable degree of decisionmaking authority from the executive and
legislative branches to the judicial.32 Moreover, this shift rests on a
concept - distributive justice - that seems among the least suscepti-
ble to judicial resolution through specific rules or principles. Even if
distributive justice enjoys widely shared recognition at some general
level, application of distributive justice principles to specific cases are
likely to prove troublesome. The relationships between wealth, recip-
rocal benefit, and social responsibility implicated by distributive jus-
tice raise questions of degree that seem necessarily to call for resolu-
tion by elected officials rather than appointed judges. Although he
avoids stating the proposition directly, Professor Dagan's analysis im-
plicitly suggests that wealth should be a suspect classification justifying
heightened judicial scrutiny. The Court has directly rejected such a
proposition, however, not only because the legislature has shown itself
capable of acting on behalf of the poor, but also because recognizing
32. It would not exaggerate the point to say that the central, driving force behind cur-
rent takings doctrine is the desire to create as clear a separation as possible between eco-
nomic regulations, on which near-absolute judicial deference is required, and takings of
property, for which the Constitution mandates compensation. Part of the reason it remains
convenient to pretend that Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon was the first "regulatory tak-
ings" case is that it facilitates this separation far better than the railroad rate regulation cases
that were, in fact, the first. Compare Heller & Krier, supra note 15, at 1005 ("Under the con-
ventional view, analysis of cases arising from such [regulatory] programs would no doubt
begin (and quickly end) with Justice Holmes's opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon."), with Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Juris-
prudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 670-71 (1996) ("Mahon is now widely understood, by Supreme
Court Justices and academic commentators alike, to be a landmark: the first 'regulatory
takings' case. This honor is ambiguous; but under any of the principal resolutions of the am-
biguities, Mahon does not deserve it."). For the railroad rate regulation cases, see, e.g.,
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898) ("But it is equally true that the corporation per-
forming such services ... may not be required to use its property for the benefit of the public
without receiving just compensation for the services rendered by it."); Railroad Comm'n
Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886):
From what has thus been said, it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regula-
tion is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is
not the equivalent of confiscation. Under pretence of regulating fares and freights, the State
cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither
can it do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, or without due process of law.
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wealth as a suspect classification would inevitably lead to judicial in-
tervention on a scale not seen since Lochner.33
Although Professor Dagan attempts to finesse the Lochner-ism is-
sue inherent in his proposal,' I do not believe that the issue can be
dismissed so readily. While Lochner is always raised against proposals
for expanding (or restoring) the reach of the Compensation Clause,
the Lochner-ism charge carries more weight in connection with Pro-
fessor Dagan's proposal because his proposal is neither tied closely to
the literal language of the Constitution nor to recognized process fail-
ures in governmental decisionmaking.35 There is simply no hiding the
fact that Professor Dagan is expressly inviting courts to second-guess
the legislative and executive branches on the issue of distributive jus-
tice.36 Because he is urging courts to intervene on behalf of the poor
and less fortunate, Professor Dagan's analysis necessarily generates
more sympathy than the Court's Lochner-era interventions, which of-
ten seemed to reflect the opposite distributive bias. But whatever
sympathy his approach may initially generate, his proposal raises the
same judicial competence concerns and is objectionable for the same
reasons as is Lochner itself.
33. The Court first rejected wealth as a suspect classification in Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970), and has steadily maintained that position in the face of a variety
of challenges. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
470-71 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973); Ortwein
v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
34. Professor Dagan takes two tacks in limiting the implementation of the distributive
justice principle in order to avoid Lochner's shadow. First, he focuses his analysis on land, as
if the Takings Clause applied only to government regulations of land use, rather than to
property rights more generally. Second, he implements the distributive justice concerns
through existing elements of takings doctrine, reciprocity of advantage, and diminution of
value. See infra text accompanying note 42.
35. In rejecting the Lochner approach, the Court in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.
identified three circumstances in which heightened judicial scrutiny might remain appropri-
ate. In footnote 4, the Court explained:
There may be narrower scope for.., the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution ... [when it] re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of un-
desirable legislation ... [or when it is] directed at particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities.
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
36. Professor Dagan's suggestion in his reply essay that a Fifth Amendment claim
should be available if injured smokers are deprived of their right to sue pursuant to the to-
bacco settlement only heightens my concern in this regard. See also Hanoch Dagan & James
J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 406-16
(2000).
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III. COMPLETING THE EFFICIENCY PICTURE: COMPENSATING THE
POLITICALLY POWERFUL
So far, we have addressed the takings case that Professor Dagan
posits, in which the government faces a choice between two project
sitings. Even if his proposal were to function properly in that context,
Professor Dagan fails to address the efficiency concerns that arise
when the government must choose between acting, and thereby im-
posing a cost on a powerful interest group, and not acting at all.37 In
such cases, Professor Dagan's hoped-for political counterbalance
could not arise. Lacking two groups of landowners on whom the gov-
ernment could impose the burden, courts cannot establish compensa-
tion rules that would adjust the relative compensation levels between
two groups to ensure a planning-based decision. Yet the powerful in-
terest group could still block desirable government action.
Professor Dagan addresses such cases in part by arguing that we
need not compensate politically powerful interest groups as readily,
because their political power will enable them to extract compensation
through the give-and-take of the legislative process.38 Although Pro-
fessor Dagan is careful to limit his assumption of legislative in-kind
compensation to cases in which a powerful interest group loses a
regulatory or placement battle, others have asserted more broadly that
legislative in-kind compensation will fully redress the risk that a pow-
erful interest group will successfully block otherwise desirable gov-
ernment action.39
This theory of legislative in-kind compensation has never seemed
persuasive to me. The argument that we need not compensate power-
ful interest groups rests on the assumption that powerful interest
groups can readily convert their political power to block a measure
into power to extract compensation with little loss in their political
leverage. Yet, this assumption neglects the fact that political power is
usually contextual and therefore inherently dependent on the position
one is taking. Thus, an interest group may have effective arguments
(and therefore substantial political power) to oppose a government ac-
tion on the merits, but those arguments might lose their persuasive
force if the group were to switch from opposition to acquiescence on
the condition of payment. More generally, the notion that an interest
group can readily switch from principled opposition to attempted ex-
tortion with little loss in associated political power is relatively iiplau-
37. Both Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), two of the three examples that Professor Dagan dis-
cusses, represent such an on-off choice.
38. Dagan, supra note 3, at 754; see also Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just
Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 308-11 (1990).
39. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 38, at 310-11.
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sible, whatever attempts are made to hide or finesse the switch. Op-
portunities for legislative in-kind compensation will undoubtedly arise
in some cases, but we should not accept as a general rule the sugges-
tion that legislative in-kind compensation is readily available to politi-
cally powerful groups.
Moreover, opportunities to extract in-kind compensation will most
likely arise when the powerful interest group is likely to lose on an is-
sue. In such a case, the group can work pragmatically for in-kind com-
pensation as a second-best alternative to blocking the proposed regu-
lation or taking. But when the powerful interest group is likely to win
and successfully block the proposed action, there is less reason for the
group to accept a carry-over token of uncertain value to abandon its
position. Even if a large enough carry-over token would persuade the
group, the government actor is unlikely to offer it. When the interest
group can persuade the government that the proposed action is unde-
sirable, the government, by definition, views the proposed action as a
net social loser. Because the government perceives the proposal as a
net social loser, the government has no reason to offer a carry-over
token to secure the proposal's enactment. The government has been
persuaded not to act, and there is simply no room for an effective log-
rolling bargain to be struck.'
In such cases, the legislature may offer to compromise, successively
watering down a measure until it finds a version acceptable to the con-
centrated interest group. But this is not a solution to the public choice
problem, merely an admission of it. Eliminating or limiting the
amount of compensation in such cases would leave the government to
accept what it can get in the face of the interest group's opposition -
an approach that inevitably means too little government action too
late. The government's ability to deliver public goods would be
sharply limited.
An up-front promise of compensation, on the other hand, can sub-
stantially overcome this public choice problem. Such a promise sub-
stantially reduces the interest group's likely opposition, gives the gov-
ernment a more accurate picture of the measure's desirability, and
40. If the government actor can see through the interest group-created appearance of
undesirability (and it probably can in some cases), then we are not dealing with a case in
which the interest group is likely to win in any event. In addition, if the government can rou-
tinely see through interest group-created appearances, then the public choice view of gov-
ernment is simply not worth worrying about and we should stick with the social choice ac-
count. For definitions of the two models of government, see supra note 18. But Professor
Dagan has agreed that concentrated interest groups can block desirable government action.
It therefore seems that the logical corollary is that they do so by creating the appearance that
the action is socially undesirable (a net loser), and by persuading the government actor to
accept this appearance as true. Given that assumption, we cannot also assume that the gov-
ernment actor can nevertheless step outside of itself, perceive that the measure is in fact de-
sirable, and offer appropriate carry-over compensation in order to ensure the measure's pas-
sage.
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leaves the government substantially more free to act on behalf of the
social welfare. It is no coincidence that we have relatively less gov-
ernment action on issues such as pollution control, wetlands protec-
tion, and beachfront preservation, in which the courts have refused to
require compensation, and relatively more government action on is-
sues such as the acquisition of military equipment and road-building,
in which the courts have required compensation.
Although Professor Dagan worries that public choice theory may
lead to a regressive compensation system,41 in which the politically
powerful receive compensation but the politically weak do not, this is
not a necessary conclusion of the public choice analysis. Limiting
compensation to cases in which the interest group would have blocked
government action but for the promise of compensation would sub-
stantially complicate the takings inquiry and inject considerable uncer-
tainty into the compensation issue. If we are to persuade concentrated
interest groups to forego use of their lobbying advantages in few-many
contests, the promise of compensation must be clear. For that reason
(and, I admit, because of distributive justice concerns similar to those
Professor Dagan articulates), I prefer an interpretation of the Takings
Clause that focuses almost exclusively on whether the government has
acted in a manner to deprive the very few of a property interest for the
sake of the very many. Whatever marginal efficiency gains we might
garner by more perfectly tailoring the rule to the identified public
choice problem would be outweighed by the uncertainty that a less
clear compensation promise would create. Further, combining a uni-
form few-many rule with increased compensation levels paid for
through progressive taxation would address Professor Dagan's dis-
tributive justice concerns as well.
IV. AN EXAMPLE: PENN CENTRAL
Professor Dagan proposes three prerequisites to an award of pro-
gressive compensation: (1) the property owner is disproportionately
burdened by the government action; (2) the burden is not offset or
likely to be offset by long-term reciprocal benefits; and (3) the prop-
erty owner is politically powerless.42 Although Professor Dagan refers
to cases in which his proposal would justify increased compensation
compared to present doctrine,43 he unfortunately applies his proposal
to three cases in which it generates the same results as present takings
41. Dagan, supra note 3, at 753-54, 788.
42. Id. at 765.
43. Id. at 798 (suggesting that compensation would be required when government regu-
lation "prohibits many uses of [a person's] land in order to preserve endangered species").
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doctrine.' Analysis of his proposal is therefore difficult, but we can
obtain some useful insights by comparing his proposal and my own in
the context of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.4" On
one hand, Penn Central represents the type of case in which Dagan's
analysis should prove most persuasive. The City imposes limitations
on the property rights of a rich, politically powerful company. 46 In ad-
dition, there is at least a plausible argument that the company receives
extensive reciprocal benefits both from this specific government action
and from government action more generally.47 On the other hand, this
case represents an example in which my analysis should prove least
persuasive. Despite its lobbying advantages, Penn Central was unsuc-
cessful in its efforts to block desirable government action. Yet, even in
this case, I believe that there is a compelling case for compensation.
Let us assume that the restrictions on Penn Central's development
rights are socially desirable and we must decide ex ante whether com-
pensation will be required if the restrictions are adopted. One way to
resolve whether Penn Central should be compensated is to determine
whether it is less expensive for society to pay for the restriction by
compensating Penn Central or for Penn Central alone to bear the cost
of the restriction. Since, in either event, the development value associ-
ated with the airspace above the terminal is lost, we can disregard this
cost. Awarding compensation changes the party within society on
whom this cost falls, but so long as compensation accurately reflects
the lost development value, awarding compensation neither increases
nor decreases this cost for society as a whole.48
In the case in which Penn Central is compensated at full value, the
only costs associated with awarding compensation are the transaction
costs of measuring, collecting, and transferring the requisite sum.
These transaction costs would not arise were we to refuse compensa-
tion to Penn Central.
44. Id. at 792-801. I would also note that I was surprised by Professor Dagan's resolution
of Agins. Given his emphasis on the need to protect groups "effectively excluded from actual
participation in law-making," id. at 778, I expected him to argue that compensation should
be required when a locality imposes the cost of open space on potential new residents who,
as yet, lack a voice in local government.
45. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
46. This seems to be Professor Dagan's characterization of Penn Central, but it is worth
pointing out that Penn Central filed for bankruptcy on June 21, 1970. In re Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 902 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974). Perhaps, under the cir-
cumstances, Penn Central should be considered a politically weak landowner unable to sus-
tain the added financial burdens of the historic designation and therefore unable to survive
the regulation long enough for the long-term reciprocal benefits to come into play. See
Dagan, supra note 3, at 798-99 n.210.
47. Dagan, supra note 3, at 797-98.
48. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165,1214 (1967).
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In the case in which compensation is denied, the costs associated
with refusing compensation would consist of Penn Central's expendi-
tures in opposing or evading the restriction.49 Although we cannot de-
termine these opposition costs precisely ex ante, we do know that, de-
pending on its perceived chance of success, Penn Central would
rationally spend any amount up to the value of the lost development
rights attempting to persuade the government not to adopt the restric-
tion.50 We also know that, even if initially unsuccessful in blocking the
restriction, Penn Central will not stop there. Given that it retains for-
mal title to the associated parcel, Penn Central will likely continue to
press its case for abandoning or weakening the airspace development
restriction whenever the opportunity arises. In that light, so long as the
transaction costs of compensating were only a small fraction (five to
ten percent) of the lost development value,51 Penn Central's continu-
ing opposition expenditures will likely exceed, sooner or later, the
one-time transaction costs entailed in awarding compensation. More-
over, we must also include as a component of the opposition costs the
risk that Penn Central's efforts will eventually persuade the govern-
ment to abandon the socially desirable preservation of the terminal.
When we add this risk, the opposition costs that will arise from not
compensating Penn Central almost certainly exceed the transaction
costs of paying compensation. Because the costs of denying compensa-
tion are likely to exceed the costs of implementing compensation, we
should compensate Penn Central for the restriction.
We can tell ourselves that Penn Central has no real basis for com-
plaint and point to the reciprocal long-term benefits that it will receive
from the property restriction. We can tell ourselves that Penn Central
is behaving irresponsibly by refusing to accept its fair share of the
community's burdens. But if our invocation of such high-minded ide-
als fails to persuade Penn Central to forego its opposition efforts, we
are merely rationalizing our decision to impose the burden on Penn
49. We can only imagine that Penn Central's opposition would substantially increase if
we denied compensation to Penn Central, but awarded it to other similarly situated, but less
wealthy landowners. Also, if compensation is awarded but is less than complete, Penn Cen-
tral would oppose the measure. But its reason for doing so - the lost development value -
would be reduced by the compensation available.
50. Actually, in each instance in which Penn Central perceived an opportunity to per-
suade the government to allow development, Penn Central would rationally spend up to
100% of the lost development value on its persuasion efforts discounted by its perceived
chance of success. Such opportunities might come up numerous times, so it is conceivable
that Penn Central could eventually spend more than the lost development value on persua-
sion efforts. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 1947 n.238.
51. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 1957-59 (justifying the assumption of low transaction
costs under a uniform few-many compensation rule); see also Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J.
Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look into the Practice of Condemnation, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 430, 440-43 (1967) (finding transaction costs in condemnation actions in the
three to six percent range typically charged private purchasers or sellers of land by real es-
tate agents).
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Central 2 and, not incidentally, increasing the overall cost of the de-
sired public good.
However emotionally attractive it might seem to impose this cost
on Penn Central, refusing to compensate Penn Central is likely to
prove a less efficient means to the desired restriction. In addition, it
will send a message to property owners more generally. It tells prop-
erty owners that they cannot rely on the Compensation Clause to pro-
tect them against government-imposed restrictions. If they want pro-
tection, they will need to lobby the government to block, limit, or
avoid such restrictions. While some of these owners will lose, as Penn
Central did, all will fight bitterly to protect their rights. 3 As a result,
refusing to compensate concentrated interest groups in the relatively
few cases in which the government is able to act despite interest group
opposition greatly increases the costs associated with the relatively
many cases in which the government will prove unable to act. Thus, to
the opposition costs of Penn Central above, we must add the cost of
those government projects blocked by interest groups because of the
Penn Central Court's refusal to require compensation. As a result, we
stand to lose far more by refusing to compensate Penn Central than
we stand to gain.
V. THE COMPENSATION CLAUSE: SEARCHING FOR PRINCIPLES
In the end, how we resolve the takings issue comes down to how
we see citizens and the government responding to the compensation
rules courts establish. Professor Michelman, for example, has sug-
gested a compensation rule based upon a comparison of settlement
and demoralization costs. This rule is driven by his assumptions re-
garding citizen and government responses. 4 First, Michelman assumes
a reactive citizenry, which waits passively for, and then becomes de-
moralized by, uncompensated government-imposed takings.5 Second,
52. As I have explained elsewhere, this process of blaming the victim is both part of the
means of overcoming interest group opposition and part of the reason legislatures are not
good at recognizing the need for compensation when it arises. Lunney, supra note 9, at 751-
53. More generally, by setting up a high standard of civic virtue against which we measure
Penn Central's conduct, Professor Dagan's argument leaves room to assert that Penn Cen-
tral's conduct is wrongful, even harmful, which resonates with the harm-benefit approach to
the takings issue. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit
Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 433, 465 (1995).
53. A somewhat different analysis justifies a few-many rule for governments character-
ized by majoritarianism, rather than by interest group pluralism. See Lunney, supra note 9, at
750-56.
54. See Michelman, supra note 48, at 1214-15.
55. I interpret Professor Michelman's citizenry as reactive based upon his focus on de-
moralization costs. In addition, Professor Michelman's definition of demoralization costs -
the disutilities and potential for lost future production "which accrue to losers and their
sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is offered" - implies a
passive citizenry. Id.
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he adopts a social choice view of the government, in which the gov-
ernment imposes burdens fairly and efficiently whether compensation
is required or not.56 Given these assumptions, the only costs affected
by the choice between compensation rules are demoralization and set-
tlement costs, and his test necessarily becomes a balancing of these
two.
Yet, despite its continuing influence, Professor Michelman's origi-
nal article vastly oversimplifies both citizen responses to takings and
the relationship between compensation and the governmental deci-
sionmaking process. Citizens are not likely to sit idly by as the gov-
ernment sorts out whose property to take. Governments, even in rep-
resentative democracies, do not invariably act in the best interest of
the public as a whole. Analysis of the takings issue therefore must ac-
count for the possibility of a proactive and opportunistic citizenry,
which learns of planned government impositions, lobbies the govern-
ment to block the imposition or shift it elsewhere, and uses the gov-
ernment to extract unpaid-for property transfers. Such an analysis
must also incorporate a more realistic account of governmental deci-
sionmaking, in which interest groups or majoritarian impulses can lead
the government astray. Indeed, the Compensation Clause makes sense
as a constitutional requirement only if we do not trust the legislature
to recognize the need for compensation and to provide it when appro-
priate. 7 In the light of these complexities, compensation becomes a
tool, not just to recompense deserving individuals for government-
imposed burdens but, more importantly, to improve an otherwise
problematic governmental decisionmaking process. 8
In line with these latter approaches, Professor Dagan interjects
into this debate a timely reminder that present takings doctrine, as
well as the realities of political power, creates a very real risk that the
government presently imposes undue burdens on the politically pow-
erless in land use decisions. The notion that we might solve this prob-
56. Professor Michelman's adoption of a social choice view of government is reflected in
his statement: "It follows that if, for any measure, both demoralization and settlement costs
(whichever were chosen) would exceed efficiency gains, the measure is to be rejected .... "
Id. at 1215. Although Professor Michelman does not say whether the courts or the legislature
is supposed to reject such measures, his compensation rule does not require compensation in
such cases, and therefore it apparently leaves to the legislature the task of recognizing and
rejecting such undesirable measures. Id. ("[C]ompensation is due whenever demoralization
costs exceed settlement costs, and not otherwise."). Moreover, nowhere in his utilitarian cal-
culus does Professor Michelman formally account for how a compensation requirement
might influence government decisionmaking. He simply proposes comparing demoralization
costs and settlement costs without any further consideration of how such a comparison might
affect a decision to take property and, if so, which property to take.
57. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 1949.
58. Others have expressed variations on this theme. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 25, at 62-63
(identifying government decisionmaking as potentially problematic when the government
acts as an enterprise and suggesting that compensation should therefore be required in such
cases).
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lem by an increased willingness to compensate the politically power-
less and a decreased willingness to compensate the politically powerful
has initial appeal. But closer examination suggests that a uniform few-
many test, together with something closer to "true loss" compensation
awards, would achieve the same distributive justice goals if funded
through progressive taxation. In addition, it would prove better able to
overcome the efficiency concerns associated with takings.
As for the normative influence of law, Professor Dagan's theory of
law as teacher has a long tradition. History suggests, however, that we
should neither overstate the law's capacity to shape individuals nor as-
sume too readily that the government will exercise this capacity in a
benign fashion. Within limits, the law can effectively require individu-
als to behave in certain ways, but it does so through the threat, or ac-
tual use, of force. And it is simply unclear what moral values are
served by forcing Penn Central and Agins to turn over their property
without compensation, as Professor Dagan advocates.
Professor Duncan Kennedy's assertion that the fundamental ten-
sion in the law is between other and self, between altruism and selfish-
ness, suffers from a similar misapprehension.59 The decision to sacri-
fice self-interest for the sake of another, which Professor Kennedy
defines as altruism and Professor Dagan defines as social responsibil-
ity, lies at the heart of individual morality, not the law. Law must navi-
gate between allowing an individual to choose for herself and making
the choice for her. When the law intervenes in an individual's life by
imposing or threatening sanctions for selfish choices, the resulting out-
comes may be indistinguishable from the choices a free, moral indi-
vidual would make. The law obtains these outcomes, however, not by
encouraging altruistic values or social responsibility but by appealing
to the individual's selfish desire to avoid the law's sanction. Thus, legal
intervention converts what would have been a choice between self-
regarding behavior and other-regarding behavior into a choice be-
tween competing self interests. To be sure, if the law allows the indi-
vidual to choose, it necessarily entails the risk that she may choose
wrongly (e.g., by privileging self over other). But if we do not allow
the individual to choose, then we have necessarily eliminated the indi-
vidual's capacity to choose correctly. As a result, relying on the law to
ensure proper conduct may weaken, rather than foster, an individual's
capacity for moral choice when the law's sanction is removed.
Social responsibility and civic virtue are, without debate, desirable
in any community. But these, like all virtues, come from within and
cannot be forced by legal rules. If we refuse to compensate Penn Cen-
tral or if we force a freeway through Beverly Hills over the residents'
objections, we can thereby compel these landowners to give up their
59. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685, 1685-86 (1976)
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property, subject to the penalty of the law, for the sake of the commu-
nity. But we should not make the mistake of thinking that we have
thereby made those landowners more virtuous or more responsible.
We have simply set the stage for them to make absolutely certain that
someone else will have the pleasure of experiencing "civic virtue" the
next time.
